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DAVID S. MASON 
The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982 
Over the last three years, the Polish United Workers' Party has suffered a major 
crisis, the most substantial crisis of any Communist party in any Communist 
party state. The disintegration of the party was at least partly responsible for 
both the development of Solidarity in the summer of 1980 and the imposition of 
martial law in December 1981. The lack of trust in the party and its authoritarian 
and unrepresentative character led the workers to demand an institution more 
responsive to their own needs. But the growth of Solidarity during 1981 and the 
continuing disintegration and fragmentation of the party led the military to 
preempt the leading role of the party in 1982. 
The collapse of the party in 1980 and 1981 was due to a number of factors.! 
The party leadership had to bear the burden of the economi<; failures of the late 
1970s and the consequent decline in the standard of living. The party itself had 
grown rapidly in size during that period, even though the influence of ordinary 
party members and local party organizations declined in the face of increasing 
tendencies toward centralization in the second half of the decade. This devel-
opment led to problems of morale even within the party and to the growth of 
horizontal barriers between the membership and its leaders. The population at 
large was increasingly annoyed and disgusted with the failure of the party to 
improve the economic situation and to allow a more honest and open discussion 
of Poland's problems. The dissatisfaction was compounded by the widespread 
perception that the elite was increasingly looking after its own interests only and 
that benefits and privileges were accruing only to those in power. 
By the spring of 1981, however, the "renewal" movement that was sweeping 
the country had begun to penetrate the party, leading it to embark on house-
cleaning and reforms of its own. Much of this initiative came from the rank and 
file of the party, while there was some resistance on the part of the leadership. 
The changes that did occur were extensive enough to worry the Soviet party 
leadership, which issued a number of warnings to its Polish counterpart. As the 
party became less hierarchical and less disciplined, as party members continued 
to join Solidarity, and as Solidarity continued to mount its challenge to the 
centralized Polish political system, the regime apparently feared a total collapse 
of the party-a collapse creating a vacuum that only Solidarity or the army could 
fill. 
In this paper I shall examine membership and policies of the party during 
1980-1982, the attitudes of the public toward the party and its role in society, 
and the opinions of party members themselves. Survey research conducted by 
Polish institutions during this period, or conducted earlier and distributed during 
The author thanks the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for supporting 
research in Poland in 1982 that contributed to this article. This study is part of a larger work in 
progress, Public Opinion and Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982. 
1. For an excellent treatment of party developments leading up to 1980, see Jack BieIasiak, 
"The Party: Permanent Crisis," in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland: Genesis of a Revolution (New 
York: Vintage, 1983), pp. 10-25. 
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1980-1982, furnishes much of the data on which this study is based. Some of 
the material is remarkably candid and provides an unusually detailed picture of 
the membership, attitudes, and role of a ruling Communist party. 
A major and long-term problem for the Polish United Workers' Party, as for 
all ruling Communist parties, is that of maintaining the elite and leading role of 
the party while simultaneously keeping the party reasonably representative of 
the population. 2 For the Polish party, it has been particularly difficult to limit 
the proportion of white-collar workers, who have dominated both membership 
rolls and leadership positions. In 1974, for example, "mental workers" made up 
42 percent of the party membership but only 22 percent of the work force. While 
49 percent of all engineers, 45 percent of technicians, and 70 percent of teachers 
were party members or candidate members, only about 18 percent of blue-collar 
workers were members of the workers' party. Furthermore, representation of 
blue-collar workers in other institutions, including workers' councils, was also 
weak. A Polish sociologist noted in 1975: 
The deg~ee of organization and social activization of workers is quite low, 
relative both to the postulated model of the working class in socialist society 
and to the size and economic role of that class. 3 
The problem posed by the lack of institutionalized mechanisms for the 
expression of workers' grievances was once again dramatized in the riots of the 
summer of 1976. One of the responses of the regime to these events was a 
sustained campaign to increase the number of workers and young people in the 
party. Party membership rolls expanded at an unprecedented rate in the late 
1970s.4 By the end of 1979, members and candidates of the party constituted 
almost 12 percent of the adult population and over 20 percent of those employed 
in the socialized sector of the economy. These percentages were the highest in 
the history of the party. The large membership tended to jeopardize the party's 
elite image and "leading role," but the expansion had increased the represen-
tation of young people, women, and blue-collar workers in the ranks of the party, 
making it as representative in these categories as it had ever been. Blue-collar 
workers, for example, constituted 46.2 percent of the party in 1979, compared 
to 41.8 percent in 1975.5 
Despite these improvements, the party was still highly unrepresentative of 
the population in several respects. While more blue-collar workers had joined 
the party, this group was still not well represented in leadership positions. Even 
though blue-collar workers constituted almost half of the party membership, they 
held only 10 percent of the central party leadership positions, and only 3 percent 
of the discussants at Central Committee plenary sessions came from their ranks. 6 
2. Darrell Hammer, "The Dilemma of Party Growth," Problems of Communism, 20, no. 4 
(July-August 1971):16-21. 
3. Jerzy Drllzkiewicz, "Udzial klasy robotniczej w aktywnosci spolecznej," in Jan Mala-
nowski, ed., Nier6wnosci spoleczne w Polsce w swietle badan empirycznych (Warsaw, 1975), p. 21. 
4. David S. Mason, "Membership of the Polish United Workers' Party," The Polish Review, 27, 
nos. 3-4 (1982): 138-53. 
5. Zycie Partii, February 1980. 
6. George Kolankiewicz, "The Politics of 'Socialist Renewal,'" in Jean Woodall, ed., Policy and 
Politics in Contemporary Poland: Reform, Failure, Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 59. 
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Peasants made up about one-third of the work force but less than 10 percent of 
the party membership. This fact was of less interest to urban residents than the 
perception-largely based on fact-that the party was dominated by highly ed-
ucated white-collar workers with high incomes. Official party statistics showed 
that 12 percent of party members had a higher education, compared to just 
7 percent of the work force. But a sample of working males in the city of L6di 
showed that 30 percent of party members had a higher education compared to 
11 percent of nonmembers. In fact, over half of those with a complete higher 
education were party members. 7 While the party considered it important to at-
tract the "best" people to the organization, including the best educated, the less 
well-educated blue-collar workers were irritated by this kind of differentiation. 
The expansion and diversification of the party did not solve the problems of 
credibility and representation for the regime. If anything, the image of the party 
as being made up of "opportunists" was reinforced in the late 1970s. Further-
more, the failure of the regime to allow decentralization of power and decision 
making even within the party was an obstacle to people's confidence in the party 
and detrimental to morale within the organization. Public assessment of the party 
remained highly negative. 
The party had never been very popular in Poland, but the lack of confidence 
in the organization was not publicly affirmed until spring 1981, when the press 
briefly referred to an official public opinion poll on confidence in institutions. 8 
Of fifteen institutions, including the government, the militia, and the old trade 
unions, the Polish United Workers' Party ranked last. While this poll showed 
32 percent of the population expressing confidence in the party, a similar survey 
conducted by Solidarity among its own members in November 1981 also showed 
the party in last place, with a confidence rating of 7 percent. 9 This very low level 
of support for the "leading" organization was derived from a number of com-
plaints Poles had about the party and about those in power. They included the 
widespread feeling that those in policy making and managerial positions were 
incompetent, that they abused their power by attaching extravagant privileges 
to their positions, that the party and the elite closed off access to decision making 
for people who were not members of the party and ruled by compulsion rather 
than consensus, and that the party had forsaken its own stated ideals of socialism 
and egalitarianism. These were wide-ranging issues that called into question the 
role of the party in Polish society. 
The sense that the party and its leadership were incompetent was not always 
as strong as it had become by 1980. During the first half of the 1970s, for 
example, there were some positive evaluations of the Gierek leadership. An 
7. From a survey of 1000 adult males in the city of L6di in the fall of 1980, conducted by.the 
Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences (hereafter L6di 1980). 
8. The survey, "Spoleczne zaufanie do instytucji politycznych, spolecznych i administracyjnych," 
was conducted in May 1981 by the Center for Public Research of Polish Radio and Television 
(Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej). 
9. Solidarity's poll, among its own members, was conducted by the Center for Social Research 
(6srodek BadaD. Spolecznych) of Solidarity's Mazowsze region: "Czlonkowie ZwillZku 0 bl~dach 
krajowych wladz ZwillZku" (Warsaw: November 1981). For results of these two polls, see David S. 
Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," Soviet Studies, 35, no. 4 (October 1983): 538. 
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official poll from 1975 showed that almost 85 percent of the people believed that 
"in the last several years society had confidence in the leadership of the coun-
try."l0 Over 90 percent of this sample believed the developments in the country 
since 1970 had been "quick," and the most frequently mentioned reason for 
these developments was "the new leadership of the party and the country." Even 
taking into consideration the official nature of this poll and the atmosphere in 
which it was conducted, the results are markedly different from answers to similar 
questions in 1981, which showed 30 percent or fewer expressing trust in the 
government and the party.u This decline in confidence in the late 1970s was due 
in large part to the decline in the economy and the standard of living during that 
period and to the simultaneous burgeoning of Poland's foreign debt. Many Poles 
wondered where the money had gone and assumed that it had been either wasted 
or appropriated by the elite, an assumption that contributed to the widespread 
belief that the economic and political leadership was incompetent. A poll con-
ducted among a small (330) sample of men in Warsaw in the summer of 1979, 
for example, showed that only 20 percent thought "ability" played a decisive 
role in helping people reach high positions in Polish society. As the researchers 
pointed out, a similar question asked in the United States showed 70 percent 
assigning a decisive role to ability.12 
The popular perception of incompetence in the leadership of the party and 
the country was aggravated by the widespread belief that the elite was unjustly 
benefiting from its positions of power. The issue of privilege has always been a 
sensitive one in Poland, a society that values highly the principle of egalitari-
anism. Unequal distribution of wealth and power is seen as contradictory to the 
basic principles of socialist society. This issue has always been discussed in Po-
land, though largely in private. In the period between 1979 and 1981, however, 
it was treated more directly and openly in both the official and the unofficial 
press. The result was an increase in popular frustration. 
In the unofficial "Report on the State of the Republic" by the "Experience 
and the Future" study group, the issues which most clearly stood out in their 
description of society were "the social structure, its hierarchical character, anti-
egalitarian tendencies, and the emergence of a system of privileges that conflicts 
with the sense of social justice so deeply rooted, thanks to socialist ideology, in 
our society."13 There was a widespread perception in Polish society at the end of 
the 1970s that social inequalities had increased over the past decade. But as one 
analyst of official public opinion data pointed out, "the present egalitarianism" 
was directed not so much against differences in earnings as "mainly against the 
economic position and life style of the leadership apparatus." Most people, he 
pointed out, believe 
it is unfair that high positions are linked with privileges and they demand 
that incomes be reduced, and that the availability of goods in short supply, 
10. Zbigniew Sufin, ed., Spoleczenstwo polskie w drugiej polowie lat siedemdziesiqtych: raporty 
z badan (Warsaw: Instytut Podstawowych Problem6w Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1981), p. 21. 
11. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public." 
12. Magdalena Gadomska, "Swiadomosc nier6wnosci," Przeglqd Techniczny, May 24, 1981, 
pp. 19-21. 
13. Poland Today: The State of the Republic, compo by the "Experience and the Future Dis-
cussion Group" (White Plains, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1981), p. 57. 
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such as housing and automobiles, access to special shops, private clubs, 
clinics, and so forth, for persons in high positions be restricted. 14 
All of these issues and complaints were to become strong elements in the 
appeal of Solidarity and its program. The preliminary program for Solidarity, 
drawn up by a group of advisers for the organization in the spring of 1981, 
demanded that restrictions be placed on the privileges of the elite and that the 
costs of economic recovery and reform be borne "particularly by people enjoying 
privileges linked with the exercise of power." 15 The restrictions on privileges were 
especially directed at those in "the power apparatus" and included limitations 
on apartments, office automobiles, and special health services and required dis-
closure of incomes and property. 
It should be emphasized here that the concern over privilege was not directed 
at the party membership at large but rather at those in positions of power. 
Considerable concern with elite privilege existed even within the party. A party 
report on letters addressed to the Central Committee by rank-and-file party 
members mentioned numerous letters advocating "the liquidation of commercial 
stores and other special stores" and "stores in the militia, the army and the 
committees of the PUWP."16 The reference to the committees of the party sug-
gests that there was concern with privilege not just in the central bureaucracy 
but at lower levels as well. Here, as elsewhere, we see that Polish society in 
1980-1981 was divided not so much between party members and nonmembers 
but rather between those in positions of power (at all levels) and the rest of the 
people, whether party members or not. 
While the issues of competence and privilege were sensitive and inflam-
matory ones, questions about the role of the PUWP in Polish society were po-
tentially much more dangerous and destabilizing. The issues raised in this context 
included overcentralization of power and lack of democracy within the party and 
the excessive control and dominance of the party in societal decision making. 
These kinds of criticism were voiced both by the public and by rank-and-file 
party members during 1980 and 1981. Kurczewski's analysis of an official poll 
by the Center for Public Opinion Research of Polish Radio and Television in 
1980 concluded that the leadership should be rotated and "the principles of 
selection and promotion be democratized" within the partyY The "Experience 
and the Future" group also argued in favor of limiting the terms of office of the 
top leadership levels of the party. 18 
Perhaps the most systematic criticism of party organization and leadership 
came from within the party. The suggestion most frequently made in letters to 
the Central Committee was that the terms of office for party leaders should be 
limited. But the writers also called for more information within the party, secret 
elections, changes in party nominating procedures, and open sessions of the 
14. Jacek Kurczewski, "w oczach opinii pubJicznej," Kultura (Warsaw), March 21, 1981, p. 9. 
15. "The Directions of the Operations of Solidarity in the Current Situation of the Country," 
Glos Pracy, April 14, 1981; translated in Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report no. 210 
(July 22, 1981). 
16. Zbigniew Sufin, ed., Diagnozy spoleczne W okresie narastajqcego kryzysu (Warsaw: Instytut 
Podstawowych Problem6w Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1981), p. 221. 
17. Kurczewski, "W oczach." 
18. Poland Today, p. 173. 
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Central Committee and lower level committees. 19 These criticisms were accom-
panied by complaints about the increasing centralization of power in the hands 
of members of the central party apparatus. Centralization took two forms: the 
arrogation of decision making authority by the party from the state and other 
institutions, and the concentration of power within the party from the periphery 
to the center. A Polish sociologist pointed out that this "absurd" process of 
centralization had reduced the significance of local party committees "almost to 
zero" in the late 1970s.20 Solidarity asserted in its program that the method of 
governing based on the domination of .the central party-state institutions "had 
led the country to ruin."21 
Many of these issues were summed up in a set of recommendations issued 
to the Central Committee of the party by a group of experts attached to the 
party's Institute of the Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism. The report, deliv-
ered in October 1980, defined the main characteristic of the crisis as a lack of 
confidence in the governing of society and suggested a number of changes, in-
cluding decentralization of state and party authority, greater intra-party democ-
racy and egalitarianism, the widening of "social participation" in decision making 
and increased autonomy for other institutions, and an improvement of the elec-
toral procedures of the party, including the nomination of two candidates for 
each leadership position.22 As will be seen below, many of these changes were 
made during 1981. 
These criticisms and recommendations reflected a deeper sense that the 
population had little opportunity to voice its opinions or participate in decision 
making. The popular feeling of alienation from politics had increased dramati-
cally during the late 1970s. In 1976 only 41 percent of a sample of males in the 
city of L6di cited the degree of "participation in governing" as a source of 
tension and conflict in society. By 1980, 80 percent cited this factor.23 Solidarity's 
preliminary program hammered at the idea that the loss of democratic institu-
tions was the root cause of the crisis: "The bureaucratic system of governing the 
state and managing the economy has helped establish a closed group of rulers 
who are not subject to control by the governed."24 
The popular frustration with the role of the party and the centralization of 
power was especially apparent in two national surveys conducted by the Academy 
of Sciences at the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, entitled Polacy '80 and Polacy 
'81.25 In the Polacy '80 survey, over 92 percent agreed with the proposition that 
there should be "increased control of society over the authorities." That this was 
not to be accomplished through the party was evident from the response to 
another question about "strengthening the role of the party in the administration 
19. Sufin, Diagnozy, pp. 209-30. 
20. Jacek Tarkowski, "Wladze terenowe po reformie," in Jerzy Wiatr, ed., Wladza lokalna u 
progu kryzysu (Warsaw: 1983), pp. 23-76. 
21. "Program NSZZ Solidarnosc," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, October 16, 1981. 
22. Sufin, Diagnozy. 
23. L6di 1980, and similar survey conducted in the same city in 1976 (hereafter L6di 1976). 
See n. 7. 
24. "Directions of the Operations of Solidarity." 
25. Polacy '80 was a national representative sample of about 2500 Poles, conducted in November 
and December of 1980 and reported in Polacy '80: wyniki badan ankietowych (Warsaw: Polska 
Akademia Nauk, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, 1981). Polacy '81 was a similar survey conducted at 
the end of 1981 and reported in an in-house publication: Polacy '81 (Warsaw: IFIS PAN). 
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of power." In 1980 only 33 percent agreed with this proposition and 56 percent 
disagreed; by the end of 1981 only 20 percent favored strengthening the party. 
When the question was reversed in 1981-whether the role of the party should 
be limited-60 percent favored the idea, while only 20 percent opposed it. Even 
46 percent of party members favored limiting the role of the party. 26 
In trying to determine the types of authority relationships desired by the 
population, the researchers for Polacy '81 asked if the respondents favored a 
centralized or a decentralized system, with or without the party playing a leading 
role. Although there was a considerable division on both issues, by far the largest 
proportion of respondents favored a decentralized system without a leading role 
for the party and "based on the participation of various social forces," as the 
statement was phrased. There was stronger support for a decentralized system 
(44.4 percent) than for a centralized one (32.8 percent). But the really astound-
ing result of this question concerned the leading role of the party. Only 24.5 
percent favored such a role, while a clear majority (52.7 percent) opted for a 
system without a leading role for the party.27 This result testifies to the thorough 
disillusionment of Polish society with the PUWP. In Poland, as in all Communist 
states, the leading role of the party has been the sine qua non of the political 
system. This principle is incorporated in the Polish Constitution and even in the 
Gdansk Agreements of 1980. It was the basis on which the Soviet Union inter-
vened in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yet by the end of 1981 
the Polish party was so discredited that the majority of Poles was apparently 
willing to revise that fundamental component of the political system. 
Frustration with the PUWP did not, however, translate into a wish to con-
stitute any new political parties. In the Polacy '81 survey only 25 percent favored 
constituting some "new political parties besides the PUWP, the Social Demo-
cratic Party and the United Peasant Party" (these are the two satellite parties of 
the PUWP, which are allied with the PUWP in the Front of National Unity and 
which have some seats in the Polish parliament but exert little independent po-
litical influence). Opposition to the creation of a new political party was fairly 
uniform across the political spectrum. Seventy-seven percent of party members 
were opposed to the idea (although 24 percent favored it!), as were 69 percent 
of Solidarity members. There was also little support for the proposition that 
Solidarity should create a political party to operate alongside the union. Only 
20 percent of the overall sample and 23 percent of Solidarity members favored 
this idea. 
The population thus did not favor the elimination of the PUWP, or even its 
replacement by other parties. It wanted a more pluralistic society, in which "so-
ciety exercises more control over the authorities" and in which there is more 
room for political participation and political maneuver by other groups, including 
the existing noncommunist parties and the trade unions. As Solidarity's program 
put it: "The state must serve man, and not rule over him; the state organization 
must serve society and should not be identified with a single political party."28 




28. "Program NSZZ Solidarnosc." 
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These increasingly vigorous and open challenges to the party could not help 
but affect the members of that besieged organization. Between August 1980 and 
December 1981, there were unprecedented changes in party membership and 
party leadership. Between the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, over 400,000 
members left the party. This was by far the largest number of defections in one 
year in the history of the party, and, with 13 percent of the total party member-
ship, the largest percentage decline except for the year 1958. In February 1982 
the official press admitted that the party had lost almost a half million members 
since July 1981. It is evident that most of those who left were blue-collar workers, 
since the working-class component of the party had declined from 46.2 percent 
at the end of 1979 to 42.7 percent in early 1982.29 
Many of those who left the party joined Solidarity, but there were probably 
even more party members who stayed in the party and joined Solidarity. Esti-
mates of the number of party members in Solidarity range up to 1.7 million of 
the party's three million members.30 This figure is probably too high. In two 
separate survey research polls at the end of 1980, 35 percent of party members 
admitted to membership in Solidarity.31 This is a remarkably high percentage in 
itself, however, and is close to the percentage of the general population in Soli-
darity (37 percent). An even greater number of party members supported Soli-
darity, even if they did not join the organization. In the Polacy '80 survey, 
45 percent of party members expressed "decisive support" for the activities of 
Solidarity. Dual membership in Solidarity and the party was especially prevalent 
among skilled blue- and white-collar workers, as is apparent from table 1. 
As the table shows, three quarters of all skilled workers, party members 
and nonmembers alike, belonged to Solidarity at the end of 1981. There were 
also extremely high rates of Solidarity membership among specialists and the 
"leadership cadre," including most party members in these categories. 
There are several possible explanations of why so many party members, 
particularly those in prestige and leadership positions, joined Solidarity. First of 
all, the appeal of Solidarity was so widespread that it cut across the lines of the 
"establishment" to include many supporters of the regime. Most rank-and-file 
Table 1. Party Members in Solidarity, by Occupational Groups (percentage) 
Occupational Groups 
Specialists with higher 
education and leadership cadre 
Middle cadre and specialists 
Office workers and administration 
Skilled workers 
Farmers and farm workers 
Source: Polacy '81. 
29. Rzeczpospolita, February 9, 1982. 
30. Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 1981. 
31. Polacy '80 and L6di 1980. 
Percent in Solidarity among: 
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party members supported the existence and goals of Solidarity and may have 
seen in it a potential means to loosen the hierarchical controls within the party. 
As Solidarity adviser Jadwiga Staniszkis has pointed out, the antihierarchical, 
antiinstitutional and egalitarian attitudes of Solidarity found support in the party 
as well and fostered genuine common interests between the "renewal" movement 
in the party and the membership of Solidarity. 32 
Second, it might be expected that party members would be attracted to 
Solidarity simply because of their political activism. Party members are joiners 
and activists and are more likely to have definite opinions on public issues. 
Solidarity provided a new channel for their activities, and a more productive 
one. That PUWP members played an active and leading role in Solidarity is 
evident from data on party membership among the factory commissions of Sol-
idarity. In five of the six regions (wojewodstwos) for which membership was 
reported, party members constituted at least 20 percent of the Solidarity factory 
commissions. 33 This overlapping membership of Solidarity and the party ex-
tended to the very top of the political system: at the Ninth Congress of the party 
in July 1981, 20 percent of the delegates were also Solidarity members. 
The changes in the party also affected the professional apparatus. In the 
eighteen months after August 1980, 53 percent of party workers, the professional 
staff of the organization, left the party "for various reasons." In the preliminary 
elections leading up to the Ninth Congress, there was "an almost complete turn-
over in the leadership cadre of the party." Eighty percent of the regional party 
committees were new, as were 65 percent of the village, town, and factory com-
mittees and 50 percent of the first secretaries of the primary party organiza-
tions. 34 Many of these newly elected local leaders were young people, often with 
short party meIllbership records. 
The turnover in the professional ranks was bound to affect the leadership 
as well. When the party congress elected a new Central Committee in July, 
91 percent of the winners were new to the position. Of the fifteen Politburo 
members elected at the congress, only four were holdovers. This was the most 
rapid and thorough change in the party leadership of any Communist party state. 
It reflected fundamental changes and strains within the organization and had 
both positive and negative consequences. The "renewal" and rejuvenation of 
the party raised the possibility of changes in policy as well, and perhaps of a 
more accommodating stance toward Solidarity. But it also caused concern and 
fear in the Soviet Union that the Polish party might be losing its "leading role." 
The PUWP made substantial efforts to clean house during 1981 and to join 
the "renewal" that was occurring throughout Polish society. These efforts in-
cluded crackdowns on corruption and illegality within the party, restrictions on 
privileges, provisions for more openness within the organization, and reforms in 
party election rules. The desire for renewal was not unanimous, however. The 
32. Jadwiga Staniszkis, "The Evolution of Forms of Working-Class Protest in Poland," Soviet 
Studies, 33, no. 2 (April 1981): 229. 
33. "'Informator Biuletynu MKZ. NSZZ Solidarnosc" (East-Central Regional Organization of 
Solidarity, Lublin), January 30, 1981. 
34. Rzeczpospolita, February 25, 1982. 
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changes elicited widespread and lively debate within the party and led to deep 
divisions between "liberals" and conservatives. 35 
The concern about corruption within the party, and particularly the fact that 
the population perceived the party as being corrupt, led the Central Committee 
to adopt a resolution in March which instructed "central and local party auditing 
commissions to accelerate work on the definition of political responsibility of 
party members guilty of violations of law and of moral principles" and called on 
state and judicial organs to do likewise. 36 The party also proceeded to conduct 
"individual talks" with members and to dismiss many from the rolls. Compared 
to the mass defections from party ranks during 1981, however, the number of 
those purged was relatively small. 
There were also efforts to defuse accusations that party officials received 
extraordinarily high pay and fringe benefits. A remarkable article that appeared 
in the party monthly, entitled "On the budget, wages and property of the party," 
contended that party salaries were lower than those for equivalent positions in 
the state administration and economy and that "party workers may not have any 
other sources of income, and do not receive any bonuses or periodic awards."37 
In an attempt to alleviate concerns about the salaries of party officials the article 
listed the wages for members of the Politburo and for secretaries of the Central 
Committee (25,930 zlotys) and for other party professionals down to the district 
level. The Politburo salary figure, if it can be believed, is 3.5 times the average 
national wage, which is within the maximum wage differential that most Poles 
consider acceptable. 
The party leadership also tried to encourage freer discussion within the 
party, although within strictly defined limits. At the plenum of March 1981, for 
example, a Central Committee resolution approved of the "lively and often 
controversial discussion" taking place within the party, adding, however, that 
discussion should remain within the framework of democratic centralism, and 
should not degenerate into "ideological pluralism." At the same plenum criticism 
of the rigidity and lack of responsiveness to initiatives "from below" on the part 
of the leadership was voiced frequently and openly.38 By the summer of 1981, at 
the June plenum of the Central Committee, the "renewal" movement had be-
come so pervasive that First Secretary Kania virtually begged the party to retain 
the leadership. Party leaders, he said, "would be interested" in ensuring that the 
present members of the Politburo and the Central Committee secretaries take 
part in the forthcoming congress as delegatesP9 The possibility that they might 
not was an indication of the reluctance of many local party organizations to grant 
central party officials safe constituencies for the congress elections. It illustrates 
once again the increasingly wide gulf between the grass roots and the leadership 
of the PUWP. Kania's concern was due in part to the extensive changes in party 
leadership at all levels that resulted from the new election rules passed by the 
Central Committee in April. Delegates to the congress were to be elected at 
35. For a thorough discussion of internal party debates on the renewal, see George Sanford, 
Polish Communism in Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
36. Radio Free Europe Research Reports, April 13, 1981. 
37. Zycie Partii, April 1981. 
38. Radio Free Europe Research Reports, April 13, 1981. 
39. Ibid., June 19, 1981. 
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provincial, plant, university, and military party conferences. Nominations would 
be made by special electoral commissions. But a crucial difference in the new 
rules was that there could be an unlimited number of nominations from the floor 
of the conferences and that the voting would be by secret ballot. In the past, the 
maximum number of nominations permitted from the floor was 15 percent of the 
available seats. The "provisional" electoral rules adopted in December 1980 had 
allowed for 50 percent, but in response to widespread criticism the limitation 
was dropped altogether. Furthermore, the provision for unlimited nominations 
had already been adopted by some regional and local party organizations. 
Another major accommodation the party had made was in its attitude toward 
religious believers within party ranks. Officially the "scientific" and atheistic 
worldview of a Marxist-Leninist party was inconsistent with religious belief. In 
practice, that inconsistency has been overlooked in a society that is overwhelm-
ingly Catholic. By 1981 even most party members professed to be believers 
(80 percent) and 27 percent called themselves "practicing" Catholics. 40 The party 
finally recognized this fact officially when the program of the Ninth Party Con-
gress acknowledged that "religious believers can join the party if they wish to 
and be politically active in keeping with its program."41 This stand was reaf-
firmed, though modified somewhat, in an article on "Believers in the Party" in 
Zycie Partii.42 The article asserted that the PUWP was primarily a political party 
and not connected with people's world view (a remarkable statement in itself). 
Believers could join the party, and the party recognized religion as a private 
matter. But the party should strive to change the world view of religious members 
in the direction of materialism. 
These changes in party policy were criticized both inside and outside the 
country. In May 1981 a party "discussion forum" in Katowice adopted a decla-
ration accusing the Kania leadership of having lost its "ideological and political 
compass in the struggle for socialism ... under the pressure of alien ideological 
influences, supported by right-wing opportunism and liberalism of the bourgeois 
type." The statement expressed alarm over increased tendencies within the party 
of "Trotskyite-Zionist views, nationalism, agrarianism, clericalism and anti-So-
vietism."43 It was not clear how large this group was, or even who was in it, and 
the declaration was rejected by official party bodies. But the fact that the state-
ment appeared in an official publication suggested that these conservative views 
had at least some support. 
Conservative elements in the party received support from a powerful outside 
voice in early June 1981, when Soviet party leader Brezhnev addressed a sharply 
worded letter to the members of the Polish Central Committee, criticizing the 
party leadership for its "constant concessions" and its inability to cope with 
40. These figures were derived from the Polacy '80 survey but were not published in Poland. 
There were claims in the official press, however, that "two-thirds" of party members were believers, 
and a lively debate over the meaning of these claims ensued. 
41. The party's program adopted at the Ninth Congress is translated in Roman Stefanowski, 
comp., Poland: A Chronology of Events February-July 1981 (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 1982), 
pp. 171-86. 
42. Zycie Partii, September 2, 1981. 
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"counterrevolutionary forces" within Polish society.44 Brezhnev also expressed 
concern about the upcoming Polish party congress and the failure of the party 
leadership to defend its "experienced cadre" in the preparatory electoral con-
ferences. He asserted that the Soviet Union was the only guarantor of Poland's 
sovereignty and reminded the party of its responsibility to the entire socialist 
community for the preservation of party rule. The language of the letter was 
pointedly similar to that of messages conveyed to the Czechoslovak leadership 
in the spring of 1968. The letter must have encouraged conservatives at the 
Central Committee plenum a few days later, where there were appeals for the 
Politburo to show some "muscle" against the forces of counterrevolution and 
Solidarity's "march toward power." In his speech to the plenum, Kania said that 
the accusations in Brezhnev's letter were "fully justified" and pledged efforts to 
meet the criticisms while maintaining the commitment to socialist renewal. 45 
By 1981 there were no major differences in outlook between members of 
the PUWP and the rest of society. Most of the views of society reflected in public 
opinion polls were similar to those held by members of the party. Table 2, drawn 
from the Polacy '81 survey, shows the responses to selected questions by party 
members and nonmembers. On some of the major issues of 1981, a majority of 
party members agreed with the majority view of nonmembers. It is clear from 
these data that party members by no means followed a hard line on these issues. 
Eighty percent favored access to radio and television for Solidarity, and almost 
half of all party members even favored limiting the role of the party in Polish 
society! 
A remarkable degree of support by party members for the actions and 
programs of Solidarity is evident in other issues, too. Only 21 percent of party 
members "decisively opposed" strikes as a form of protest (compared to 
13 percent of nonmembers). When asked about participation in acts of protest, 
party members more frequently admitted to such acts (21.6 percent) than did 
the overall sample (18.4 percent). When asked who was responsible for the gov-
Table 2. Public Opinion of Party Members and Nonmembers on Major Issues in 1981 
(percentage) 
Issue 
Support Guaranteeing Solidarity Access 
to Mass Media 
Support Limiting the Role of the Party 
in the Administration of Power 
Support for the Development of Private 
Agriculture 
Oppose Temporary Increase in the Powers 
of the Militia and the Security Forces 
Source: Polacy '81. 
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ernmental and political CrISIS, party members rarely blamed Solidarity (see 
table 3), even though they were also less likely than nonmembers to assign pri-
mary responsibility to the government. Furthermore, they overwhelmingly op-
posed hard-line emergency measures to cope with the crisis at the end of 1981.46 
If there had earlier been a division between party membership and society, 
this division largely disappeared by the middle of 1981. The division became one 
between society, including most party members, on the one hand and the state 
and party leadership on the other. Many party members had joined Solidarity, 
and most of them sympathized with its goals. As Alain Touraine's groups con-
cluded from their interviews with Solidarity activists, "ordinary members of the 
Party are closer to members of Solidarity than they are to their own leaders."47 
The party had joined the process of renewal, but the process was being blocked 
at the top. 
In the course of 1981 the authorities became increasingly isolated even from 
the party membership. In October Kania was replaced as first party secretary 
by Premier General Jaruzelski, marking a further diminution of authority for the 
party. Even Lech Wal~sa recognized the dangers posed by the weakening of the 
party. In an interview with Western reporters just before the imposition of martial 
law, he pledged to help the party if it started to discredit itself or collapse: 
There are no other realities here. We cannot overthrow the party. We cannot 
take the power away from it. We have to preserve it. At the same time, 
tame it and let it eat with us, so that it will relish what we create. 48 
But it was too late even for Wal~sa to help the party. In the face of accelerating 
demands from Solidarity and the accelerating disintegration of the party, Jaru-
zelski was faced with considerable pressure from hard-liners in the bureaucracy. 
There is even some speculation that party bureaucrats attempted to seize power 
in March and again in December. According to a Western observer, "the day 
before martial law was imposed, Jaruzelski sent the entire apparatus of the Polish 
Central Committee into the provinces, trapping them there in order to prevent 
a concerted response."49 Jaruzelski claimed that the army had taken control to 
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reestablish order and stability and to prevent the total collapse of the party, 
which he said was threatened with "physical liquidation." In the months following 
the imposition of martial law, the regime made efforts to restore the legitimacy 
and reputation of the party. There were extensive purges of party functionaries 
at all levels in an apparent effort to "trim both wings" of the party. According 
to Jaruzelski, the changes in the party cadres in the two months after martial 
law were the most extensive in the history of the party. 50 The party was also 
trying to attract back many of those members who had turned in their party 
cards after August 1980. But these efforts faced a contrary tendency: tens of 
thousands of party members who had stayed in the organization during the Sol-
idarity era turned in their cards in protest of the imposition of martial law. 
Membership continued to decline during 1982. 
The role of the party in Polish society was another issue that elicited lively 
and open debate during 1982. In a discussion of the relationship between the 
unions and the party, Trybuna Ludu (the party daily) declared that "it is the 
party, or rather political parties, and not the trade union movement, which are 
the instruments representing the interests of various classes and nation-wide 
interests."51 But by the spring the line had softened somewhat, partially perhaps 
because of the regime's lack of success in resuscitating the party. In discussions 
about the creation of a "Front of National Understanding" (Front Porozumienia 
Narodowego), which was presumably to playa political role, it was stressed that 
the front should include people who were not members of the party and even 
those who "do not like socialism."52 The front "should enable all social organi-
zations in favor of the political and social system in Poland to participate in 
political decision making."53 Despite this rhetoric, the martial law regime was 
unsuccessful in transforming the party, the front, or any other official organiza-
tions into legitimate representative bodies. By the end of 1982, the regime still 
faced a dilemma. Martial law was suspended and formal power returned to the 
party and state offices. But the reputation and membership of the party remained 
at low levels. By imposing martial law, the army had provided a crutch to the 
injured party. But the party was still not able to walk without at least leaning 
on the army. 
The events of 1980 and 1981 marked a fundamental turning point both for 
Poland and the other European Communist states. For the first time in the 
postwar history of this region, virtually the entire population united to demand 
a qualitative transformation of the system. Most basic was the demand for a 
broadening of the base for participation in economic and political decision mak-
ing and for restrictions on the decision making prerogatives of the party elite. 
Support for this demand was widespread even among the party membership, 
which also suffered from the centralization of power. 
The need for political decentralization in the Communist states and its ben-
efits have long been recognized by Western political scientists. As David Lane 
has put it, "the rigid centralised political system devised to implement rapid 
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industrialisation now becomes redundant when its major task has been com-
pleted. It comes into conflict with participant-oriented groupS."54 By 1981 the 
imperative for such change was being openly discussed in the Polish press: "In 
a word, an escape from the crisis demands changes in the political system, 
changes of a qualitative character, such that the system would rely not on methods 
of compulsion, but on methods which in effect lead to the desired integration of 
society."55 Poland was moving from a "subject political culture" to a "partici-
pant" one. Solidarity was the main vehicle for this movement, and the central 
party bureaucracy was the main obstacle. While many elective party posts fell 
into the hands of reformers during 1981, the central administrative staff-largely 
appointed-remained intact. This group was the most threatened by the chal-
lenges posed by Solidarity. In retreat, the central party organization relied in-
creasingly on power to maintain its position. In the past the party had been able 
to derive some legitimacy from socialist ideology. As the ideological legitimacy 
of the party waned, power became the overriding motivation for the bureaucracy, 
further exacerbating the tensions between the rulers and the ruled. The elite 
increasingly depended on "exclusionary closure" to maintain itself. 56 But in doing 
so it became further removed and alienated from society. 
Solidarity tried-unsuccessfully-to reform the Polish political system from 
the "outside." In order to reform the system, it was necessary to penetrate and 
reform the party. There was considerable success in this regard; many party 
members joined Solidarity or sympathized with it. The grass roots of the party 
initiated significant changes in the rules, structure, membership, and leadership 
of the organization. Even the central party leadership tried to adapt to the new 
environment by encouraging initiatives, democratization, and decentralization at 
the lower levels. But by the end of 1981, the process of renewal was caught on 
the horns of a dilemma: the reform was too slow for many members of Solidarity 
and too fast for the party bureacracy (and the Soviet leadership). Many members 
of Solidarity believed that the union was making too many compromises and that 
the only way to move ahead was to continue the pressure on party and govern-
mentY This group constituted only about a third of the membership (and lead-
ership) of Solidarity, but it was a vocal minority. The regime targeted its criticisms 
on these "radicals" and identified them as the dominant force within the move-
ment. The appeals of this group for new elections to the Sejm and a referendum 
on the party triggered the declaration of martial law. 
Many Poles were equally dissatisfied with the pace of change within the 
party. "For Poles of the 1970s, the present party would have been the realization 
of their most ardent aspirations," but for Poles in late 1981, "the party is still 
not democratic enough, not sufficiently humble, too sure of itself, too ready to 
usurp power and therefore untrustworthy."58 The party had undergone the most 
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substantial changes in its history, indeed in the history of any Communist party. 
Yet the population remained critical of its concentration of power and privilege. 
The party bureaucracy saw its position as dire, and this perception was 
reinforced by the continuing demands of the more radical Solidarity supporters. 
The regime-in contrast to Solidarity-defined renewal as "a process of social 
adjustment articulated and implemented 'from above."'59 But this concept con-
flicted with what was happening both in society and in the party itself, where 
most of the changes were generated from below. The party leadership was put 
in an unusual and uncomfortable position: for the first time in its history, the 
PUWP was not the primary agent for initiating social and economic reforms. At 
the same time, the Soviet leadership was issuing dark warnings about the neces-
sity of maintaining the leading role of the party. The imposition of martial law 
probably reflected a combination of two interests among the elite: to maintain 
itself in power and to avoid the possibility of Soviet intervention. 
During 1981 the Polish United Workers' Party had attempted to adapt to 
the renewal that was sweeping the country. It became less hierarchical, more 
representative, more democratic, and more reformist. It effected significant 
changes in its own membership, leadership, organization, and processes. But the 
party, like Solidarity, exceeded the boundaries of the possible in the Poland of 
1981. The changes that occurred in the party threatened its "leading role," the 
sine qua non of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. While most party members 
were willing to adapt the party to Solidarity's Poland, much of the entrenched 
party and government bureaucracy was not. And those elements found powerful 
support both within the country and without. Contrary to the expectations of 
most Poles, the democratization of the party was not a sufficient guarantee of 
the process of renewal. 
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